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Introduction
This chapter deals with immigrant integration policies developed over the
past two decades in France. It focuses on integration contracts, which aim
to ensure public promotion of the ‘values of the Republic’ among new-
comers eligible for residence permits, whether they be migrants or refu-
gees. These programs are part and parcel of the ‘civic turn’ (Mouritsen &
Jørgensen 2008) in immigration and integration policies implemented in a
variety of European countries from the late 1990s onwards. Consistent
with public discourses on the failure of multiculturalism and the related
need for a ‘muscular liberalism’ (Cameron 2011), the desire to return to
‘thick’1 conceptions of integration (Etzioni 2011; Walzer 1994) and indeed
to policies that focus on assimilation (Brubaker 2001; Honohan 2016) has
developed in many parts of Europe. Such desire as well as the parallel
concern about consolidating national identities are notably visible in the
development of citizenship trajectories and training sessions within the
framework of migration policies designed to foster a thick integration into
the broader society, and subsequently, to strengthen the conditions for
granting residence permits.
Although there are differences between these programs, they all share a
common public purpose: to promote the core values declared to be the sub-
stantive foundation of the political community. Such a public aim is con-
sistent with the emphasis placed on ‘shared values’ by the European
Commission and the Council of Europe in the 2000s (Pélabay 2011a), and
with the multiplication of civic education policies dedicated to the inculcation
of the values shared by ‘good citizens’ (Kostakopoulou 2010; Pélabay 2011b).
What emerges as a true politics of common values reveals a growing distrust
of the celebration of diversity broadly criticized for its fragmentary effects on
the society as a whole. It also implies an ongoing moral and/or cultural
‘thickening’ of citizenship. In the European context, national integration
policies are then developed with two main objectives: to condition the pro-
cess of integration itself, notably through its contractualization, and to pave
the way for state promotion of the ‘values’ of the host society. Taken
together, these two objectives lead to a conception of integration where
respect for ‘values’ placed at the heart of the ‘us’ are imposed on ‘others’ as a
constraint included in a contract between foreigners and the State.
In France, such contractual value-based integration has been implemented
through a series of programs such as the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration
(CAI), drafted in 2003, its family reunification counterpart, the Contrat d’Inté-
gration pour la Famille (CAIF), developed in 2007, and the more recent Contrat
d’Intégration Républicaine (CIR) which replaced both of the former in 2016.
In this chapter, we will investigate the French State as a value promoter by
focusing on the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration and the Contrat d’Intégration
pour la Famille. Our analysis is based on a field survey carried out between
2012 and 2015 that includes fifteen observations of one-day training deliv-
ered within the framework of these two contracts. Thirteen of these training
days were delivered in two training centers in Paris and the remaining two in
Lille. These observations were complemented by in-depth interviews with
five trainers, a number of informal interviews with attendees, and eight
policy-makers. In addition to these data, our study builds on a content ana-
lysis of documents and communication tools related to integration contracts,
notably the forms that must be signed, and the civic training PowerPoint; as
well as discourse analysis of a number of institutional reports and statements
made by political elites.
On this basis, the chapter examines the rationale behind the implementa-
tion of the two contracts, the manner in which the ‘values of the Republic’
are publicly articulated and inculcated to incoming migrants and refugees,
and the tensions that emerge from such a republican politics of common
values. Finally, we will ask whether the French ‘republican values’ discourse
and practice may – just like European ones – lead both to the homogeniza-
tion of the majority identity and to the exclusion of minority identities con-
sidered as embodying value systems which are not only different but also
opposed to ‘ours.’
A climate of civic anxiety about the survival of the ‘Republican
model’
The background to the launch of the Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration (CAI) in
2003 was colored by a growing sense of anxiety about social cohesion (Helly
2009; Holtug & Mason 2010), immigration, and Islam – three questions
which have been continually present and combined in public debate in
France since the 2000s. Their combination is incarnated by a term: commu-
nitarianism. In itself, this term seems to encapsulate all French anxieties
(Dhume-Sonzogni 2016), in particular the fear that the so-called ‘French
model of integration’ could disappear under the effect of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’-
style politics of minority rights. Hence the need to promote the ‘values of
the Republic’ as a remedy to the cultural fragmentation of the society, and to
reaffirm them in a contract that binds foreigners to the State. In this respect,
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the CAI was conceived as a means to reaffirm that the French model alone
can resist communitarianism. As declared by François Fillon when he was
Minister for Social Affairs in 2002: ‘Living in France means choosing France
together with its duties and ideals. Our country is not merely a geographical
area … it has chosen integration over communitarianism’ (Tabet 2002).
During this same period, pessimistic views that supported the affirmed
need to revive more ‘robust’ integration policies multiplied. This resulted in
a call for policies that were very demanding of foreigners with regard to
respect for the collective identity that would supposedly guarantee the unity
and indeed the integrity of the Republic. A number of events then con-
tributed to a solid reinforcement in public discourse of phrases such as
‘broken down integration,’ ‘a weakening of national sentiment,’ and ‘the
Republic’s values under threat,’ all of which acted as signposts for a return
to assimilation. This phenomenon explains the successive controversies sur-
rounding the ‘veil’2 which led to a law banning the wearing of religious
symbols in schools in 2004. To this, we must add the 2005 suburban riots,
which were analyzed in public debate through the prism of Islam (Tiberj
2014) and erected into a powerful symbol of the integration crisis (Fassin &
Fassin 2006). Blandine Kriegel (2005), the then president of the Haut Conseil
à l’Intégration, said:
The suburban crisis highlights the existence of the sure failure of our
integration policy.… For decades, we chose to abandon the very term
‘integration’ – which has always been controversial – and substituted it
for recognition of diversity and the fight against discrimination. These
are two necessary actions; however, on their own, they have provided a
foundation to communitarianism.
In 2007, the call for integration to be prioritized over respect of differences
was oriented towards an identity politics with the creation of the Ministry of
Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-development. The min-
istry subsumed the question of immigration into the question of national
identity, as shown by the launch, in 2009, of a ‘debate on national identity’
designed to answer the urgent need stressed by the then Minister Éric
Besson to reflect on ‘what it means to be French,’ ‘the values we share,’ ‘the
nature of the ties which mean we are French,’ and on our duty ‘to be proud’
of what we are (AFP 2009). From that point on, the question of national
identity was regularly present on the political scene and ultimately placed the
idea of a ‘cultural insecurity’ among the majority group at the center of
debate (Bouvet 2015).
At the same time, the term assimilation, which had disappeared from
political vocabulary for a time, reappeared in public discourse. In 2003, the
then Prime Minister, François Fillon, pronounced himself to be in favor of
‘integration … and indeed of assimilation’ (Zappi 2003). Some years later, in
2010, as advisor to President Nicolas Sarkozy, Henri Guaino (2010) very
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explicitly advocated for a return to assimilation: ‘I am indeed saying assim-
ilation. I am aware that the word upsets some people but for 200 years,
assimilation has been the Republic’s program.’
These leitmotivs of a crisis in integration and a necessary return to assim-
ilation resurfaced with force following the January 2015 terrorist attacks on
the Charlie Hebdo newspaper and the Hyper Casher supermarket, and even
more so following November 2015 when Paris became a bloodbath (130
people were killed and more than 400 injured by a group of fundamentalist
Islamic terrorists). Unfurled in its symbolic dimension (Faucher & Boussa-
guet 2018), the political response of those in power was to wager on a form
of patriotism based on the defense of ‘our’ shared values (Pélabay 2017a).
From the initial launch of the integration contracts – the CAI and the
CAIF – to the most recent adjustments to them, this context of civic anxiety
about the destabilizing effects of diversity (Macedo 2000) constitutes the
background of the movement towards contractual integration.
Contractual integration: the CAI and the CAIF
The process towards contractual integration started in such a context reveals
the strong connection between, on the one hand, the type of rights which
foreigners might aspire to and, on the other hand, their individual responsi-
bility for both the success of their integration and the fulfilment of their
obligations to the French State and society at large. Thus, a report on the
2003 bill relative to immigration and residence for foreigners in France sti-
pulates for the CAI and the CAIF:
Since integration is defined as including reciprocal rights and duties, it
was logical to establish a link between efforts made by new arrivals to
make a success of their entry into the society that is hosting them, and
the status that the said society confers on them with respect to right of
residence.
(Mariani 2003: 22f)
Once a ‘tool for integration,’ the status of resident has now become a
‘reward’ for successful integration, as underlined by the law professor
Danièle Lochak (2009).
Implemented in 2003 on an experimental basis, the CAI became manda-
tory as part of the July 24, 2006 law on immigration and integration. The
program is intended for immigrants who wish to settle in France on a long-
term basis. More precisely, it is for incoming migrants who have been gran-
ted their first residence permit and refugees whose status has already been
validated in France. It also targets previously undocumented migrants whose
situation has been regularized. By signing such a contract, migrants and
refugees commit to respecting and living in accordance with the ‘values of
the Republic.’ The latter are listed in the CAI form as follows: democracy,
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the rights and duties attached to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen, ‘laïcité’ (‘secularism’), equality, and the French language.
After one year – the usual duration of the contract – a civil servant deter-
mines whether migrants have met the contractual requirements by verifying
that they attended the training sessions and met the ‘Republican integration
condition’ analyzed below. The non-fulfilment of the contract can be used
by the administrative authorities (i.e. the Prefect) to refuse renewal of the
residence permit.
The preamble to the CAI summarizes its philosophy as follows: ‘Choosing
to live in France, means choosing to integrate into the French society and
accept the fundamental values of the Republic.’ These two types of engage-
ment give meaning to the clauses contained in the contract. While Article 2
of the CAI stipulates that by agreeing to the contract, the foreigners commit
to ‘diligently’ attending the training sessions designed to prepare for their
‘integration into the Republic,’ Article 1 defines the obligations of the State
which, in reality, are limited to delivering the said training sessions. The
training is of a varied nature. It includes language training, when this has
been deemed necessary following a French language evaluation. Applicants
also have the option of an information session on life in France (procedures
for everyday life, access to public services such as health, education, etc.)
and a skills/competence evaluation if one has been prescribed. Most impor-
tantly, all the signatories of the CAI must attend civic training.
The latter is limited to a day-long session lasting eight hours. The civic
course is divided into five modules and covers ‘the history of France,’ the
‘values, principles, and symbols of the Republic,’ ‘institutions of the
Republic,’ ‘French nationality and citizenship,’ and finally ‘France and
Europe.’ The accompanying PowerPoint presentation alone contains almost
80 slides. Interviewed trainers and participants agree that the program con-
tent is far too packed. As observed during our field survey, the trainers
begin the class with explicit reference to the preamble of the contract:
You have committed to following these training sessions, to making the
necessary efforts for your integration, and to respecting the values and
the principles of the French Republic. France and the French people are
attached to a history, a culture, and a set of fundamental values. In order
for everyone to live together, you must know them, understand them,
and respect them. By committing to respecting the ‘values of the
Republic,’ you will find your place fully in French society. Choosing to
live in France means choosing to integrate into the French society.
The text concludes with ‘Welcome to France!’ written at the bottom of the
page; a ‘Welcome!’ which contrasts with the reality of the participants’
experiences, many of whom have been residents in France for many years
and who only find themselves obliged to follow these sessions as a result of
frequently chaotic legal trajectories. For example, while observing a session
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in Paris, we counted nine participants among the total of 25 who had been in
France for at least ten years, one of whom was from the Ivory Coast and had
been in France since 1995. ‘When I arrived here, Mitterrand was still in
power! So yeah, I know France,’ he said, and speaking laughingly to the
trainer: ‘I could even take your place if you want!’
The November 20, 2007 law extended the logic of contractual integration
(Hachimi Alaoui 2016) by introducing a second contract, the Contrat d’ac-
cueil et d’intégration pour la famille (CAIF), which is added to the CAI and
aims to ‘prepare families for the republican integration into French society’
(Immigration Act n° 2007–1631). This second contract targets spouses and
children who came to France as part of the family reunification process. The
CAIF contract is concluded between the State and the two spouses who
commit to respect the obligation to send their child/children to school and
to attend a specific training on the ‘rights and duties of parents.’ The training
is divided into four themes: ‘gender equality,’ ‘parental authority,’ ‘chil-
dren’s rights,’ and their ‘schooling.’ As is also the case for the CAI, the
residence card is only granted after proof of attendance at the training ses-
sion is furnished.
The 2007 law also demands that candidates for family reunification
(aged between 16 and 65) have already ensured that their knowledge of
the French language and of the ‘values of the Republic’ have been eval-
uated in their home country prior to their arrival. If they fail these tests,
the aspiring immigrants must take civic and/or language classes before
leaving their country of origin. Here again, they must provide proof that
they have done the training in order to be granted a visa, which does not
dispense them from signing the CAI on arrival in France (Hachimi Alaoui
2014). This last element – which does not exist anymore – has been
interpreted as a sign of a shift from a process-based vision of integration
to a vision focused on the ‘integrateable’ character of migrants and their
prior adherence to the values enshrined in the host country. As Éric
Fassin (2010: 160–1) writes:
If a person must be, if not integrated, at least suitable for integration
before arriving in France, even with respect to private and family life –
and yet private life is recognized as a right by the French Constitution
and by the European Convention on Human Rights – it means that the
nation pre-exists before any foreign intrusion. This is about preserving it
in its entirety, rather than exposing it to outside influences.
To conclude, it should be noted that within the framework of the March 7,
2016 law on foreigners in France, the CAI and the CAIF were replaced in
2016 by a new contract: the Contrat d’intégration républicaine (CIR). As a
result of the introduction of a pluri-annual resident’s card, the CIR has been
designed to become part of a ‘personalized pathway towards republican
integration,’ in keeping with the objective of ensuring individual
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responsibility. Furthermore, the introduction of this new contract signals a
re-centering on three pillars: 1) the declared ‘strengthening’ of the mandatory
civic training, which has been extended to two days, one of them being
entirely dedicated to the ‘principles and values of the French Republic;’ 2)
access to employment as a new priority; and 3) a more demanding level of
linguistic proficiency. Henceforth, signatories must have completed level A1
(beginner’s level)3 of language ability to obtain their first residence permit.
Once the pluri-annual residence permit expires, migrants are required to
have attained level A2 to be granted a permanent residence. While the new
contract is characterized by a pragmatic focus, it nonetheless maintains some
thicker conditions for being recognized as fully integrated. As the press
release that presents the CIR specifies, the foreigners’ personal commitment
to ‘respect the essential values of French society and the Republic’ remains
of crucial importance for their being able to prove their ‘republican
integration.’
Mandatory respect for the ‘values of the Republic’: conditional
integration
From the start, there is an obvious tension between the mandatory signing of
these integration contracts and the fact that free will is usually exercised in
the decision to sign a contract or not. Moreover, our field survey shows that
the mandatory nature of the CAI and the CAIF has weakened the symbolic
aspect of signing them, and transformed them into an added administrative
formality to obtain a residence permit. Furthermore, a number of authors
(Cournil and Depigny 2008; Lochak 2009) postulate that the CAI and the
CAIF are one-sided given that the obligations truly weigh on one party only:
the foreigner. Indeed, the State obliges migrants to sign a contract according
to which the only ‘obligations’ incumbent on the State are to provide the
foreigners with the means to honor the commitments which the State itself
subjects them to honoring. These two tensions are amplified by the fact that
the CAI and the CAIF are both marked by the same vision of a ‘conditional’
integration.
The ‘Republican integration condition,’ which must be met for a residence
permit to be delivered, lies at the very heart of the contractual integration
process. The ‘assimilation condition’ is already a legal requirement (Hajjat
2012) for naturalization applicants; the ‘integration condition’ has now
entered legal vocabulary. In the explanatory statement of the 2003 parlia-
mentary bill on controlling immigration, this condition was justified as a
means to block communitarianism. In a memo addressed to French Préfets
(Prefects) throughout the country, Nicolas Sarkozy, the then Minister of
Internal Affairs, explained:
This integration condition is intended to assist you in preventing com-
munities from turning in on themselves by encouraging more vulnerable
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publics, and in particular the women who form part of some of these
communities, to become involved in such a program.
(Ministry of Internal Affairs, Internal Security and
Local Liberties 2004)
The ‘Republican integration condition’ was firstly conceived of for residency
status and is now a condition for the majority of residence permits.
As seen above, certificates of attendance distributed at the end of
each training program provide formal proof that the clauses of the
contract have been respected, and is constitutive of the objective
dimension of the ‘integration condition.’ However, this condition
includes subjective aspects which prove to be much more difficult to
assess, in particular the personal ‘commitment’ towards the Republic’s
values and ‘willingness’ to integrate. And all the more so as the proble-
matic aim of ensuring adherence to these values has been added to, if
not substituted for, simply ‘knowing’ what the ‘values of the Republic’
are and ‘respect’ for related rights and duties. With the introduction of
this type of discourse relative to personal convictions (Pélabay 2014),
there is a real danger that arbitrary decisions will be made about whe-
ther the ‘Republican integration condition’ has been met by the for-
eigner or not. Indeed, no concrete elements for the Préfet to base their
opinions on the foreigner’s compliance of this requirement have been
established. This holds true even if the 2004 memo invites adminis-
trative officials to ‘solicit the opinion of the mayor of the foreigner’s
residential commune, so that he/she might enlighten the official’s deci-
sion by providing information that illustrates or not the foreigner’s
willingness to integrate French society.’
As a result, one question remains unanswered: how do préfecture officials
go about evaluating such a personal commitment to respect the ‘values of
the Republic,’ and to sincerely adhere to them? There are two difficulties
here: on the one hand, the fact that it is clearly impossible to probe indivi-
dual consciences, and, on the other, the semantically undefined nature of a
large number of ‘common values.’
In 2011, an inter-ministerial workgroup was set up to define ‘Repub-
lican values’ so that a new version of civic training could be designed.
However, the end result of the discussions showed the diversity of
approvals and practices among the working group members who had no
choice but to find consensus through a process of elimination: republican
values ‘are not symbols,’ ‘neither are they covered by the law, which
defines lawful or unlawful acts,’ and are not the equivalent of ‘the main
legal, constitutional and international principles.’ When the field survey
was carried out, one of the female working group members confided in
us that the discussions had been very lively: ‘it was not easy to come to
an agreement even though we were all civil servants specialized in such
questions!’
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‘Common values’: vague language and a potential
confusion of genres
The difficulty highlighted by those in charge of developing and imple-
menting programs designed to reinforce respect for the ‘values of the
Republic’ is more broadly linked to one of the characteristics of the
language surrounding common values: its intrinsic vagueness. Indeed,
nothing is less clear than the meaning of the ‘common values’ that are at
the heart of public discourse on all political sides. Even when the same
‘values’ are being talked about, very different and at times competing
interpretations are given: major universal principles that underlie the
democratic State; legal norms that confer citizen rights and liberties;
moral codes and personal convictions that are borrowed from particular
visions of the Good and the Bad; the evocation of roots (notably reli-
gious ones) and a historical patrimony constitutive of a particular civili-
zational legacy; habits and customs that have shaped an ethnocultural
way of life observed by the majority of the national group (Pélabay
2017b). All of these represent different understandings of the so-called
‘common values,’ ranked here by increasing moral and/or cultural
thickness. They correspond to visions of integration with varying degrees
of robustness that consequently reflect varying degrees of ‘welcome’
extended to diversity.
Clearly, such semantic vagueness has a number of advantages for users of
this type of language. It allows them to address a very wide public, while
leaving it up to each individual to conjure up their own vision of what con-
stitutes and delineates ‘us.’ At the same time, simply accepting the unde-
termined nature of the values is problematic given that the vagueness of the
language used goes beyond the discursive level, and, on a practical level, has
a real impact on the public policies designed to promote confirmed ‘values.’
As a consequence, defining what the term ‘values of the Republic’ signifies in
the CAI and the CAIF is of paramount importance.
As stipulated in the contract, the ‘values of the Republic’ are placed on a
legal and political footing and, as seen above, are limited to a few general
democratic principles. Nevertheless, with the ‘negative’ definition offered by
the actors involved (i.e. everything that they are not), the term ‘values of the
Republic’ goes beyond the simple framework of rights and legal duties that
govern the political order.
In the 2010s, an explicitly identity-based interpretation of integration was
predominant in the public discourse that framed the CAI. Gender equality is
particularly indicative of this shift from an interpretation based on a princi-
ple of justice to an interpretation based on French identity and culture
(Hachimi Alaoui 2012). Gender equality is expressed in the CAI as a ‘fun-
damental principle of French society’ that is potentially defendable as a legal
norm translated into a series of laws. Yet, it is frequently presented to for-
eigners as a characteristic feature of the collective identity of the French
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people. Thus in 2011, one of the participants in the inter-ministerial group
tasked with defining the ‘values of the Republic’ explained that ‘equality
between men and women’ was ‘a national trait linked to the history of
France.’
A similar conception, which drew on the authenticity of a national patri-
mony emerged from the presentation made by Arno Klarsfeld (2012: 7) –
president of the Office Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration Executive
Board from 2011 to 2013 – on the language training given within the CAI
framework:
Our customs are the fruit of many centuries of shared history together.
They represent an overall legacy which we identify with, even if it
changes progressively as a result of various influences and the passage of
time. … This France which is nearly unchanging in the arts, in its mili-
tary strength and in law, is for the most part immensely generous and
sometimes – but very rarely – unkind when prejudice that has not yet
been eradicated attempts to hurt or stigmatize.
The passages from the 2011 Information Report on nationality law that
focus directly on the CAI attach the same importance to the survival of a
national tradition, going as far as to show cultural compatibility as a relevant
piece of criteria to judge the suitability of candidates applying for residence
permits and/or citizenship. In this Report, Claude Goasguen (2011) thus
affirmed:
the first vocation of this tool is to guarantee the integration of foreigners
who want to remain on French soil for the long term. The objective
remains that the new arrivals adopt behaviors that do not infringe on the
morals and customs of the host country.
The way the ‘values of the Republic’ are defined in these statements reveals a
tendency to culturalize citizenship and the condition of integration. As we
will see now, such tendency has huge consequences for the respect of plur-
alism and the capacity for inclusion in society.
Value-based integration: the dangers of homogenization and
exclusion
Analysis of how the ‘values of the Republic’ are used in the CAI and the
CAIF shows that both programs are marked by a strong tension between
two different, and indeed competing, conceptions of integration: on the one
hand, an ‘ethical’ concept of integration including the stabilization and
reproduction of ‘the basic ethical orientations of the cultural form of life
dominant in [a particular] country,’ and on the other hand, a ‘political’ con-
cept of integration based on respect of the legal norms institutionalized
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through citizenship (Habermas 1998: 225–8). According to the latter, satisfy-
ing the aspirations of the majority group that a real or fictional background
consensus on particular cultural values might remain untouched, is not a
requirement for integrating into the political community. What is required is
to act in a way that conforms to the legal norms which apply to all in the
same way. This also means that, in themselves, cultural values cannot serve
as criteria to decide who is suitable to become a member of the social body
and who is not.
This theoretical clarification serves to underline the point that the public
strategy of making genuine adherence to the ‘values of the Republic’ a con-
dition for acceptance and integration into the political community entails a
number of risks.
Let us look firstly at the problems caused by the infringement of the
State’s neutrality, which occurs when the so-called ‘values of the Republic’
are affirmed as personal convictions about what is good, what is a life worth
living, and what kind of behavior leads to a good life. An example of these
problems is given by Christian Joppke (2010: 141) when discussing ‘citizen-
ship exams’ for naturalization: ‘an exam that scrutinizes a candidate’s inner
disposition is problematic, precisely because it transgresses the thin line that
separates the regulation of behavior from the control of beliefs.’ As Joppke
(2010: 142) explains in relation to a German case of interview guidelines
issued by the regional government of Baden-Württemberg in September 2005,
the ‘transgression’ here consists of intruding into the inner conscience and
violating freedom of thought of applicants who belongs to a particular
group – in the case at hand, Muslims since these guidelines targeted nation-
als from the Islamic League States – whose presumed values were assumed
to be contrary to the liberal democratic order. Hence the problem raised by
‘repressive liberalism’ which is prepared to develop ‘illiberal’ policies ‘in an
attempt to regulate people’s values and beliefs’ (Joppke 2012: 1).
Culturalizing the ‘values of the Republic,’ such as exacerbated by the
departure from State neutrality vis-à-vis personal visions of the good, carries
the twofold danger that public culture becomes homogenized and ‘others’
excluded. This is what Habermas (2004: 14) warns about: for him, the
ambivalence between the ethical-cultural and legal-political sides of the lan-
guage of common values paves the way toward
the predominance of a majority culture, which abuses its historically
acquired influence and definitional power to decide according to its own
standards what shall be considered the norms and values of the political
culture which is expected to be equally shared by all.
Such an identity-based reading of ‘living together’ (le vivre-ensemble) increases
the probability that in order to be accepted into the Republic, individuals
and groups who espouse different values – or values perceived to be differ-
ent – will be forced to prove that they conform to a way of life which has
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been declared to be ‘ours’ without any further justification being called on to
confirm its validity. This would quite simply result in transforming the
observance of rights and legal duties, which are mandatory for all, into a
cultural conformity requirement.
It is highly probable that such an identity-based definition of political
integration makes the measures designed to support it entirely counter-pro-
ductive. By favoring the tendency to play the ‘value system’ of the majority
group over ‘value systems’ attributed to minorities, it fails on two levels vis-
à-vis its own stated ambitions: the reinforcement of ‘republican values,’ and
reciprocal understanding within a diversified society. The coupling of
national identity with democratic citizenship, which the substantialization of
the ‘values of the Republic’ entails, weakens the universalist claim of demo-
cratic principles and basic rights by making them just one ‘value system’
amongst others and in competition with these others. Such weakness
undermines the distinctive normative status that characterizes public norms
and rights proper to a republican citizenship that steers away from competi-
tion with collective identities. Furthermore, such a coupling increases the
risk of creating a fragmented society as it multiplies reasons for disagreement
and distrust between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The entire inclusive and pluralist
ambition of a society then becomes compromised.
Conclusion
The possible dangers of homogenization and exclusion, as discussed above,
are not specific to the French State’s promotion of ‘shared values.’ These are
two worrisome tendencies that concern the European Union (EU) as a
whole. Facing the challenge of their ‘democratic deficit’ (Føllesdal & Hix
2006), EU institutions, notably the European Commission (Dratwa 2014),
have been engaged in the public promotion of a set of ‘core values,’ which
have been declared to unite European citizens and nations, and to form the
foundations of the EU. From the call for an ‘extra touch of soul’ by Jacques
Delors4 (1989) to the plea for the EU to be a ‘community of values’ (and not
a mere interest-based group) by José Manuel Barroso5 (2007), such discourse
expresses the desire to foster a sense of belonging to the EU, and thus its
‘input’ or ‘subjective’ legitimacy (Bellamy & Castiglione 2008), through a
shared belief in ‘European values.’ Of course, the declared ‘values of the EU’
mainly refer to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, and mutual
respect. In this way, they might be interpreted as a set of purely legal norms
or universal ideals of justice; and the very fact that within the Lisbon Treaty,
in particular, the articles that state the conditions of inclusion/exclusion to/
from the EU, the term ‘values’ has replaced the term ‘principles’ used in the
treaties up to that time, might seem to be an irrelevant semantic detail.
However, it should be observed that those who apply the language of
common values in support of European integration stress that references to
‘European values’ gain their added value – compared to constitutional
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principles – from their strength in terms of cultural identification. And most
importantly, such identity potential, encapsulated in the appeal to ‘Eur-
opeanness,’ is considered an asset in overcoming challenges to the legitimacy
of the EU, thus recoupling ethical-cum-cultural and political integration.
This is the point made by Barroso (2013) when he declared that if we are to
build ‘a new narrative for Europe,’ ‘we must never give up any of our values,
our culture or our way of life, our European way of life.’
The promotion of a European thick community as the foundation of the
EU is made explicit by the communitarian thinker Amitai Etzioni. In his
view (Etzioni 2007: 24), European integration needs a ‘normative-affective’
community characterized by ‘a core of shared values (i.e. a moral culture)
and a web of bonds of affection,’ and he adds: these are ‘particularist values’
(Etzioni 2007: 33), not universal ones, which embody some ‘shared under-
standings of what is good,’ not of what is right (Etzioni 2005: 132). Like their
national(ist) counterparts, the European discourse and practice of common
values tends to dismiss the thin and cold language of legal norms and uni-
versal principles of justice as a sound basis for integration. But it might well
be that a politics of rights proves to be more effective and legitimate not only
to overcome the combined dangers of homogenization and exclusion
attached to the politics of common values but also to reach integration
within culturally and ethically divided societies.
In this respect, a return to the field survey is instructive. During CAI
civic training sessions, we observed that both trainers and migrants made
a distinction between what is relative to the area of law and what pertains
to culture and morals, thus giving concrete expression to the philosophi-
cal differentiations between ‘political’ and ‘ethical’ conceptions of inte-
gration. The part that focusses on ‘Values, principles and symbols of the
Republic,’ and in particular gender equality and reciprocal relations
between men and women, was frequently an occasion for the trainers to
make the session interactive, allowing participants to contribute to the
discussion. When one trainer asked if a woman should obey her hus-
band, one woman explained by answering: ‘Whether it’s here in France
or where we come from, it’s the same thing; you can’t have two captains
on a boat! If you want it to work, there has to be one captain only!’ The
whole room laughed, and another participant added: ‘If you’re told
you’re the man, you’re the man! For me, a woman must obey her hus-
band.’ As there was uproar in the room, the trainer took the floor again
and she explained: ‘The civil code is clear: within the household,
authority is shared by the father and the mother. That’s the law, that’s
the way it is.’ The room calmed down and the trainer continued with her
program. During a discussion about polygamy in a training session in
Paris entitled ‘Rights and duties of parents’ one participant took the floor
and began a long explanation of the reasons for polygamy in his country
and he ended by concluding: ‘But anyway, we know it’s forbidden here,
it’s the law, that’s the way it is.’ These different examples reveal that a de
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facto shift is occurring from cultural values, which public discourse places
at the core of civic training, to legal norms. Both trainers and participants
recognize that the law is what counts. These observations show the
advantage of placing the question of common rules that must be respec-
ted on the objective level of the law, rather than on the level of moral
and cultural values belonging to a warm and thick identity. By using the
language of law, many trainers escape discussions which would place dif-
ferent values and competing value systems at odds with each other.
As analyzed by this piece of field research, and as convincingly argued by
Justine Lacroix (2009) in relation to the political theory of European inte-
gration, there is good reason to give priority, in theory and in practice, to a
rights-based – instead of a values-based – conception of integration. For
nothing prevents the discourse and practice of common values, be they
national or European, from transmuting into a homogenizing and exclu-
sionary identity politics focused on the survival of an ethical-cum-cultural
version of the ‘us’, at the expense of the search for a truly pluralistic type of
integration.
Notes
1 On the distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ morality, see Walzer 1994 (xi, note 1)
where he qualified as ‘thick’ a ‘kind of argument’ which is ‘richly referential, cul-
turally resonant, locked into a locally established symbolic system or network of
meanings,’ by contrast with a ‘thin’ argument which refers to ‘universalist mor-
ality,’ including procedural principles of justice.
2 In France, the wearing of the Islamic headscarf and niqab in public is debated
under the terms ‘veil’ (‘voile’ or ‘foulard’) and ‘full-face veil’ (‘voile intégral’)
respectively.
3 Language levels going from A1 to C2 correspond to the Common European Fra-
mework of Reference for Languages.
4 Jacques Delors was President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1994.
5 José Manuel Barroso was President of the European Commission from 2004 to 2014.
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